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Abstract: This research addressed acquired firm CEO’s demographic characteristics’
impact on post-acquisition performance based on upper echelons theory and managerial
networking theory. Unlike domestic M & As, cross-border transactions are always
accompanied with management issue of newly acquired foreign organization. Efficient use
of local resource and system, successful post-merger integration progress, and appointing
appropriate top management would be one of the most important issues that acquirer
needs to address（Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Tihanyi et al., 2000). Recently Korea
society has skeptical perspective on over-educated qualification and its substantial
usefulness due to continuous disappointing performance of highly-educated and well-
networked CEOs（Kim et al., 2013). Thus, this study tried to approach theoretical
considerations in an empirical way. In case of in-bound cross-border M & As in Korea over
the last ten years, generally accepted preferable characteristics for the top management of
acquired firm were not accorded with empirical observation at least in this study and it
supported theoretical assertions regarding CEO’s demographic characteristics’ influence
on firm performance such as an impact of age and education level of CEO.
I. Introduction
For the successful M & A, factors affecting post-acquisition performance had been
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academically approached in many different ways over the last several decades. Some
academic perspectives addressed from antecedent side of M & A and some perspectives
focused on the period in the middle and after the close of M & A. As for the antecedent
considerations, conglomerate mergers（Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Berger &
Ofek, 1995; Lubatkin, 1987), relatedness（Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Lubatkin,
Srinivasan, and Merchant, 1997; Walker, 2000; Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1983), method
of payment（Franks, Harris, and Mayer, 1988; Travlos, 1987; Walker, 2000), acquisition
experience（Franks, Harris, and Titman, 1991; Haleblian and Finkenstein, 1999;
Hayward, 2002; Kroll et al., 1997）issues were addressed by prior researchers. For the
post-acquisition perspectives, there had been academic approaches on integration process/
management（Ashekenas et al., 1998; Quah & Young, 2005; Burgelman & McKinney,
2006; Birkinshaw et al., 2000), integration impact on synergy creation（Moon, 2007),
integration success factors（Quah & Young, 2005; Shimizu et al., 2004; Cartwright &
Cooper, 1993), and integration depth/policy（Berry, 1980).
Among the academic approaches regarding post-acquisition performance, integration
team and its leader including appointment of right leader, structuring appropriate
organization and empowerment and so on, gets more attention from practitioners and
researchers. The importance of top executives and CEO on firm performance had been
widely recognized by academia and can find various academic addresses（Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2005). Upper echelons theory and managerial networking
theory provide academic foundations for studying the importance and the relationship
between top executives and firm performance. Upper echelons theory asserts top
management gives significant influence on organization’ s performance. In addition, it
includes the concept that top managements’ demographic characteristics affect their
recognition system to make a strategic decision so that top it enables leading organizational
strategic decision making process and eventually result in firm performance（Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). Managerial networking theory asserts top management’s social network
and connection with the upper class can reduce firm’s transaction cost and contribute to
overall performance（Luo, 2003). Based upon this theoretical ground, empirical research
on top management’s demographic characteristics and firm performance had been
occasionally conducted（Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Hambrick, 2005; Cheng et
al., 2010). However, the academic research on top management’s demographic
characteristics influence on post-acquisition performance in the context of M & A had not
been addressed and empirical studies in the area remain largely unexplored.
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II. Review of literature
1. Findings of prior researches
An active role of top management in an extraordinary situation such as M & A is
rather important than ordinary times. Considering the nature of M & A as one of the
biggest investment occasion, top managements including CEO and top management teams
are unavoidable to take the most decisive role for the success（Tihanyi et al., 2000).
Overall operation for the post-acquisition integration need to be addressed by top
managements appropriately and it requires overarching insights and delicate aspects to lead
and manage complex processes. Nonetheless, relatively little research had academically
approached for the roles and responsibilities of the leaders of post-merger integration but
there are increasing academic attentions on this area（Ashkenas & Francis, 2000).
Ashkenas and Francis（2000）described diverse responsibilities of integration leaders and
team reflecting various complicated circumstantial issues comparing ordinary business
environment.
Epstein（2004）also posited that integration leaders should be more ambitious,
confident and independent of preconceptions from professional ancestry or personal
experiences than ordinary business managers. The importance of integration leaders’
special role was known through the difficulties of AOL and TimeWarner’s case, which had
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1 Modified from the initial categorization by Ashkenas and Francis（2000）
Figure 1. Categories of responsibility for integration managers1
troubled in effective communication between executives from each company. And, in
Daimler Chryslers’ case of failure, Mr. Schrempp’ s imbalanced and biased perspective
against Chrysler such as regarded Chrysler as subdivision of Daimler, resulted in huge
financial loss and departure of key talents from Chrysler（Epstein, 2004). Thus, an event
of M & A requires CEO’s diverse capabilities and concentration on integration works
which makes organization to rely highly on CEO’s talent than normal period（Schuler &
Jackson, 2001）The academic approach in the area to address the required capabilities and
characteristics of integration team, leaders and CEO, will contribute both in theoretical
and practical purposes（Ashkenas & Francis, 2000).
Considering CEO’s significant contribution on the successful firm performance and
acquisition performance, many prior academic approaches had been explored this area as
Table 1 describes.
Research result shows that diverse variables, accounting for CEO’s characteristics
have significant relationship with firm performance and related measures. For example,
CEO’ s age shows negative relationship with R & D spending and international
diversification while CEO’ s education was positively related to firm performance and
international diversification（Barker & Mueller, 2002; Jalbert et al., 2002, Tihanyi et al.,
2000). Prior research efforts focused more on addressing CEO and top management team
（TMT)’ s association with normal firm performance or strategic commitment. Plus,
studies had been focused on U. S. based firms and tested theoretical assertions only with
that samples. Thus, expanding the scope of dependent variable to other dimension, which
combines that commitment and performance, could be meaningful for future research and
covering other regional base would be able to provide another theoretical contribution.
2. CEOs in Korea
After the Korean War, the intervening six decades have seen South Korea change
dramatically from a war torn nation with few resources into Asia’s 4th largest economy,
and the world’s 15th largest（Stangarone, 2013). In the meanwhile, Korean companies
developed their management style from traditional Asian one, based on Japanese
management style to westernized one accepting more practical and efficiency driven
management style such as U. S. corporations usually takes. And due to the increasing
inflow of high level managers having higher educational background at U. S. and
westernized countries rather than Asia, management style changes faster and extensively.
Thus, current Korean companies have fairly unique organizational and management style,
which could be called as a ‘hybrid’ style of east and west side of the world（Chen, 2004).
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Table 1. Findings of prior researches on CEO’s characteristics and firm performance
Research-
er
Description
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable
Empirical
study result
Regional
coverage
Control
Variables
Barker &
Mueller
（2002）
Examines im-
pacts of the
characteristics
of CEOs on
R & D spend-
ing
R & D spend-
ing
CEO tenure Insignificant Business
week 1,000
listed com-
panies from
1989 and
1990
Firm size, insti-
tutional stock
holdings, past
financial per-
formance, re-
lated diversifica-
tion, unrelated
diversification
CEO age Negatively re-
lated to R & D
spending
CEO stock
ownership
Positively cor-
related with R
& D spending
CEO career
experience
and education
in eng., sci-
ence, and
R&D
Positively asso-
ciated with R
& D spending
CEO educa-
tion
Insignificant
Ling et al.
（2007）
Investigates
the effects of
founder-
CEOs value
on firm per-
formance
Firm per-
formance
CEO collecti-
vism
Positively cor-
related with
older firms
while nega-
tively related
with younger
firms
SMEs at
New Eng-
land, U. S.
Top Manage-
ment Team
（TMT）size,
TMT tenure,
type of industry,
environmental
uncertainty
CEO novelty Positively asso-
ciated with
firm perform-
ance and great-
er in younger
firms than in
older firms
Jalbertet al.
（2002）
Addresses the
impact of
CEO’s educa-
tional back-
ground on
firm perform-
ance and
CEO’s com-
pensation
Firm per-
formance and
CEO’s com-
pensation
CEO educa-
tional back-
ground（Pos-
session of a
degree, where
the degree
earned）
Positive associ-
ation with firm
performance
U. S firms Debt ratio,
growth in sales,
firms size
（log asset）Degree: Posi-
tive relations
with CEO
compensation-
School at-
tended: No sig-
nificant effect
A pool of professional executives from outside who take in charge of improving overall
performance in private equity funds’ portfolio company or being assigned a very special
task such as integration or restructuring as a top management, appeared recently and the
size grows bigger and bigger（Tseng, 2008). Thus, Korea possesses various interesting
aspects in terms of management style, CEO characteristics and, of course, the importance
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Matta &
Beamish
（2008）
Examines the
association of
CEO career
horizon with
the engage-
ment in inter-
national
acquisitions
Engagement
in interna-
tional acquisi-
tions
CEO career
horizon
（time to re-
tirement for a
CEO）
Positive effect
on the proba-
bility of inter-
national ac-
quisitions
U. S. firms CEO education-
al level, func-
tional back-
ground, interna-
tional experi-
ence, tenure, sal-
ary and bonus,
prior firm per-
formance, firm
age, firm size,
firm level of
internationaliza-
tion, variance of
historical re-
turns, institu-
tional owner-
ship, industry
classification
CEO in-the-
money option
holdings
Positive rela-
tion with entry
through inter-
national ac-
quisitions
CEO equity
holdings
Interaction ef-
fects shows sig-
nificantly posi-
tive relation-
ship
Tihanyi
et al.
（2000）
Investigates
the impact of
various top
management
team charac-
teristics on
firm interna-
tional diversi-
fication
International
diversification
Age Negatively re-
lated to the
degree of inter-
national diver-
sification
U. S. -based
computer
and elec-
tronics man-
ufacturers
Prior perform-
ance, size, top
management
team size
Tenure Positively asso-
ciated with in-
ternational di-
versification
Elite
education
Positively cor-
related with the
degree of inter-
national diver-
sification
International
experience
Positive rela-
tion with inter-
national diver-
sification
as an economically successful country in Asia. To test the proposed theoretical foundations
on CEO characteristics and post-acquisition performance, Korea would be one of the best
places to address those theoretical hypotheses empirically and empirical test comparing
with other Asian countries would be much interesting considering delicate differences in
management style between those Asian countries. Consistently, this study would like to
empirically address theoretical propositions regarding CEO’ s characteristics and post-
acquisition performance using M & A cases in Korea to provide a perspective on selection
of right person as an integration leader.
Korean society traditionally looks upon higher educational background as one of the
most important qualifications like China does（Sollenberger, 1968). From Confucianism’
s influence, Koreans tends to emphasize education itself and consider academic
achievement as the biggest part of the success of life（Pearce, 2006). This tendency affects
prior and current Korean government’s public official recruiting system, which select only
few outstanding candidates through rigorous public examination. The tradition of public
official recruiting process has been supported during several hundred years ago. So,
naturally, Korea society appreciate higher educational background and certificates or titles
qualifying certain public exams or recruitment process such as doctors, certified public
accountants, lawyers, and public officials. But recently in Korea, there are skeptical
perspectives on over-educated qualification and its usefulness. There had been many
disappointing cases reported, which had bankrupted after appointing outsiders as top
management who are well-educated and experienced at various professional area and even
at public sectors（Kim, Y., Yim, S., & Seo, M., 2013). And it became a shock to Korea
society so that people became to be skeptical to over-educated qualification. But, on the
other hand, there is strong social ties between members of qualified people networks and
usually tend to cooperate with each other. These strong ties attract firms to hire those who
have a membership in the network（Chen, 2004). In reality, major university professors
frequently takes roles at government minister, high level public officials takes top
management or senior advisor position for the largest private conglomerate companies and
the largest financial institutions in Korea（Kim et al., 2013). Moreover, to precede a
smooth integration progress after executing M & A, firms in regulatory industry assign
prior high level government officials for managing regulatory authorities and appoint
specialized veterans to get over specific difficulties such as restructuring professionals and
supply-chain experts（Tseng, 2008). Thus, these characteristics of Korean society are able
to provide solid ground for testing upper echelons theory and management networking
theory.
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Multi-national companies pay more attention to the economic growth of Asia due to
the continuous marginal growth of old Western economy（Kim & Cho, 2012). The
intention to get into Asian market has been grown so that multi-national companies’
acquisitions in the area became active. Among other countries, a country which gives more
comfortableness to investors such as Korea has been considered the most preferred targets
（Kim & Cho, 2012). However, academic researches empirically addressing CEO and
post-acquisition performance（or firm performance）had rarely been covered Korea. As
stated above, Korea has many interesting and meaningful aspects in terms of academic
research considering their successful economic growth, a hybrid corporate culture, and
Korean society’s atmosphere related with upper echelons and top management’s networks.
An earnest effort to address Korean corporates would be meaningful and contributable for
both academic and practical purposes. Thus, through this study, I would like to address
upper echelons theory and managerial networking theory for Korean acquired firms in an
empirical way by extending existing firm performance perspective into post-acquisition
context. The study addresses the impact of CEO’s demographic characteristics on post-
acquisition firm performance for Korean companies, focusing on cross-border in-bound
transactions.
III. Hypotheses
There are many theoretical considerations regarding organizational mechanisms
producing collective outcome. They asserted that diverse surrounding environmental
factors and organizational decision making system determine organizational outcome
（Hall, 1977; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Some scholars paid attention on the perspective
that human capital should be regarded as the most significant intangible asset for a firm’s
operation and their characteristics are connected with firm performance and successful
execution of firm strategy（Hitt et al., 2001; Wright et al., 2001). Recently, theories that
top management’ s demographic characteristics and individual attributes dominantly
contribute to create organizational outcome, are frequently addressed by many researchers
（Hambrick, 2005; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
According to the upper echelons theory, top managements’ demographic elements of
education, age, experience and etc. have strong ties with firm performance. Particularly,
educational background can be considered as standards of personal skill set and intellectual
competencies. Of course, intellectual competency is an essential element to make
managerial capability, can result in organization’s competitive advantage and superior firm
performance（Wailderdsak and Suehiro, 2004; Boyatzis, 2004). Amount of formal
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education of CEO were positively associated in innovativeness of organization and CEO’s
greater cognitive complexity（Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Thomas et al.,
1991; Barker & Mueller, 2002). Thus, education level gives significant influence on
enhancing adaptability in uncertainty, flexibility from confidence and capability finding
alternatives. It also enables to possess capability to resolve complicated problematic
situation and not to be too much conservative on decision making process（Hambrick &
Mason, 1984; Hitt & Tyler, 1991). On the other hand, some studies assert firm
performance would be influenced by the type of higher education received by their CEO
and not directly associated with the amount of education（Hambrick & Mason, 1984;
Tyler & Steensma, 1998). Due to the nature of advanced academic programs（i.e. PhD
and above), which attract conservative, risk-averse students and give lessons on analytic
skills to avoid potential risks and mistakes, too much educated CEOs are likely not to
commit innovative or risk-taking moves（Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Barker & Mueller,
2002, Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1996). Particularly, in Barker and Mueller（2002)’ s
empirical research about CEO’s characteristics, they posited that education level showed
curve linear relations, which positively associated until CEO’s college degree and slightly
negative relations with R & D spending and organizational performance. Especially, Korea
society often shows skepticism on the top management’s over-educated qualification and
its direct association with firm performance since Korea society has too much respect on
educational background, which even becomes a social problem（Kim et al., 2013). Thus,
in overall, empirical evidences regarding influence of education level and type are mixed.
Accordingly, considering the situational distinctiveness of M & A, which requires leader’s
innovative and adventurous aspect to go through fickle environment, I expect CEO’s
educational level’s gradually diminishing association with acquisition performance.
Hypothesis 1: CEO’s education level is diminishing association with acquisition
performance after a certain level of education
The most persisting assertions regarding top management and CEO’s age is that older
managers tend to be conservative, avoid risks and pursue stable outcomes by taking proven
manners（Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Barker and Mueller, 2002). Earlier empirical
research conducted by Child（1974）found older top managements follow lower-growth
strategy and they have less physical and mental stamina required to execute overall change
of organization. Learning theory also supports older executives’ difficulty in accepting new
idea and adopting new behaviors（Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Plus, Carlsson and
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Karlsson（1970）pointed out older executives, considering their career life span, may
think much of financial and career security so that any risky decisions and moves that may
harm their achievement. Due to Confucianism’s influence in Asian countries including
Korea, age gives negative impression on the adventurous decision making（Pearce, 2006).
On the other hand, there are perspectives that experienced long-tenured old managers can
get over diverse difficulties and utilize effective strategies leveraging their various
experiences（Barker & Mueller, 2002). From the organizational learning perspective,
experience and age should be regarded as an important element that enrich the knowledge
and experience so that the performance can be developed（Reed & Defillippi, 1990).
Miller（1991）asserted experience of top managements provides confidence and
substantial capability to operate and manage the organization properly with having
competence in control and managing risks resulting in solid firm performance eventually.
Thus, theories and research results around top management and CEO’s age are mixed.
However, considering the situational distinctiveness of M & A, which force top
management to have more decisive and risk-taking aspects（Barker and Mueller, 2002), I
would like to hypothesize negative relationship of CEO’ s age with post-acquisition
performance.
Hypothesis 2: CEO’s age is negatively associated with acquisition performance
Social networks of top management level significantly influence on organizational
performance and outcomes（Adler & Kwon, 2002; Shipilov & Danis, 2006). Particularly,
top managements’ personal network and relationships can affect significantly in the case of
unusual events such as M & A. The type of membership of social network that top
managers participate helps measuring social ties and networking capability of top
managements（Luo, 2003; Cheng et al., 2010). Individuals who hold membership at
important professional association, political parties, and socially influential groups are
likely to have better and much more social relationship capital rather than having
memberships for less important groups（i.e. leisure sports clubs, socializing groups). This
can be adapted to business performance. Top executive’ s diverse and profound social
networks and relationship capital can help achieving market information, guide of
changing regulation and even works for persuading and getting support from various
stakeholders inside or outside of company（Luo, 2003). In the same vein, Korean
government and large conglomerate companies in Korea often employ outsiders who hold
advanced degrees and certificates in specific area（Kim et al., 2013). Individuals who hold
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certificates or titles such as doctor/PhD, lawyer, CPA, etc. which qualification is publicly
recognized and have experienced professional institutions such as investment banks,
consulting firms, research institutions and etc. can possess strong social ties and much
more relationship capital. Consistently with this perspective, I expect positive influence of
CEO’s professional experience on post-acquisition performance.
Hypothesis 3: CEO’s professional experience is positively related to acquisition
performance
Acquisition experience has been regarded one of the most important factor which
affect post-acquisition performance in prior academic researches on this area and many
researches had been conducted based upon behavioral learning theory and learning-curve
perspective（Haleblian & Finkelsetin, 1999). Bruton et al. （1994）hypothesized firms
with acquisition experience acknowledge when to buy and how to manage outside
financial, and legal advisors and understand key factors to lead successful integration. They
found positive association with acquisition experience and post-acquisition performance.
And Hitt et al.（1998）also found similar supportive relations between acquisition
performance and firm’s acquisition experience. Accordingly, I hypothesize positive
association of firm’s acquisition experience with post-acquisition performance.
Hypothesis 4: Acquisition experience is positively related with acquisition performance
Relatedness of acquirer and target firms also a frequently addressed issue in post-
acquisition performance related studies. Many scholars empirically addressed relationship
between the relatedness of acquiring firms and post-acquisition performance and
successfully proved a positive influence（Salter & Weinhold, 1978; Homburg & Bucerius,
2006). Prior studies also stated that the relatedness relieves acquiring firm mangers burden
to get to know of the acquired business and it results in positive performance（Hitt,
Harrison, & Ireland, 2001). Consistently with these perspectives, I expect industry
relatedness’ positive relationship with post-acquisition performance.
Hypothesis 5: Industry relatedness of acquirer and target firms is positively associated
with post-acquisition performance
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III. Data and methodology
1. Data
This research targets companies of listed and non-listed companies in Korea but
covers only externally audited firms to make sure of accuracy of data. Corporate financial
information comes from audit report submitted to financial advisory committee in Korea.
CEO’s individual information were referred from Naver portal’s people database and got
additional information from KISLINE HR source. Companies’ historic name changes and
CEOs’ name were traced by KISLINE corporate data. Corporate financial information
had been collected with 3 years of period from the year of acquisition executed. M & A
information had collected from Mergermarket data from 2003 to 2012 and verified the
events using JOINS.
Total number of transaction2 in Korea over the last 10 years from 2003 to 2012, was
2,228 and Korea targeting cross-border transaction was 298 cases. Considering two years
of period for estimating post-acquisition performance, and invalidity of accurate
transaction information, 169 transactions were remained during the period of 2005 to
2010. Then, considered only majority deals, completed deals, verification results,
bankruptcies, re-sale and etc., final samples remained were only 27 deals.
2. Dependent variable
Selecting appropriate measure of post-acquisition performance is also an important
issue to address M & A and its accompanying performance. Koo（2012）described
categories of measures of post-acquisition performance: 1）financial performance
measures（e.g. profitability, sales growth, etc.), 2）capital market focused measures（e.g.
cumulative abnormal returns, cumulative excess returns, etc.）and 3）qualitative
measures on HR and cultural issues（e.g. top management turnover, employee resistance,
degree of acculturation etc.). Plus, within the category of financial performance measures,
prior researches considered various time horizon and types when estimating M & A’s
influence, such as long-term financial performance（Chatterjee, 1992; Harrison et al.,
2005; Lubatkin et al., 1997, etc.), short-term financial performance（Berger & Ofek,
1995; Capron & Pistre, 2002; Chatterjee, 1991; Eckbo, 1983; Seth et al., 2002, etc.）and
normal accounting measures（Anand & Singh, 1997; Brush, 1996; Krishnan et al., 1997;
Morosini et al., 1998, etc.). In addition, Zollo & Meier（2008）described three types of
measures of post-acquisition performance in their research: 1) The task level. This is the
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2 includes 30% or more share deals
measure helps considering the degree of progress proceeded among overall integration
process planned（i.e. IT system integration/conversion, productivity enhancement
practice transfer, etc.). It helps considering whether both organizations’ integration
progress completed satisfactorily or not. 2) The transaction level. This helps measuring the
degree of substantial value created directly from transaction, which planned when decided
an execution of acquisition. The substantial value as realized synergy such as cost efficiency
enhancement and revenue growth difference would be examples of this type of measures.
3) The firm level. It measures post-acquisition performance as a performance of combined
entity. The firm level measures consider post-acquisition performance as an aggregated
outcome of complicated interactions of various elements surrounding an event of M & A.
Table 2 describes Zollo & Meier（2008)’ s categories of post-acquisition performance
measures.
Accordingly, this study adopted financial performance measures representing overall
firm’s outcome to consider successful business operation after M & A. At first, revenue,
operational income, net income, returns on asset（ROA), returns on equity（ROE）
were considered for the post-acquisition performance measures. Considering the
performance change in the first and second year of acquisition, the first and second year of
each performance measures were individually employed. However, initial regression results
allowed us to consider ROA and ROE to be our ultimate post-acquisition performance
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3 Revised the original table from the Zollo & Meier（2008)’s study（Zollo & Meier
（2008), “What is M & A performance?,” Academy of Management Perspectives, Aug.: 55-
76
Table 2. Categories of post-acquisition performance measures3
Level of analysis
Time horizon
Short-term Long-term
Task -Integration process performance
-Knowledge transfer
-Systems conversion
-Customer retention
-Employee retention
Acquisition -Short-term financial performance
（event study）
-Overall acquisition performance
-Acquisition survival
Firm -Accounting performance
-Long-term financial performance
-Innovation performance
-Variation in market share
measures, considering statistical accountability for proposed research model.
3. Independent variables
I used key independent variables to test proposed hypotheses. First, I adopted Edu to
measure the education level through putting the years of formal education that CEO
received. Age was considered as the CEO’s age in the first year of acquisition. Professional
experience is a dummy variable and was coded 1 if CEO had experienced more than two
years at consulting firm, Security Company, banks, and research institutions or if he/she
holds doctoral degree, pass the public official exam, have certified accounting and financial
professional（i.e. certified public accountants, certified financial analyst, etc.）and coded
0 otherwise. As for acquisition experience（i.e. Acq. Exp）is a dummy variable
considering firm’s acquisition experience, coded 1 if buyer possess prior M & A experience
and o otherwise. Industry relatedness is also a dumdum variable explaining buyer and
target firm’s industry accordance, coded 1 if they are in the same industry and 0 if they
belong in different industry.
To enhance accountability of my research model, several control variables were
employed. International D is a dummy variable for considering CEO’ s international
experience, coded 1 if CEO has international experience including study abroad and work
experience outside Korea and 0 otherwise. Insider and outsider D is also a dummy variable
to take into account CEO’s origin of workplace, coded 1 if CEO is an outsider and 0 if
insider. In addition, firm size was controlled with log value of total assets and financial
stability was also controlled with debt-equity（DE）ratio of the firm.
4. Regression model
In conclusion, the regression model for cross-sectional analysis to address proposed
hypotheses had been drawn as described below.
Acquisition performance (ROA, ROE)＝α0＋β1 Edu＋β2 Age＋β3 Prof. exp
D＋β4 Insider/Outsider D＋β5 Intl D＋β6 Relatedness D＋β7 Acq. exp D＋β8 Log
Firmsize＋β9 DE Ratio
IV. Empirical results
Table 3 describes descriptive characteristics of variables. Based upon samples
characteristics, CEOs took the roles in the event of M & A showed difference in
demographic characteristics comparing with normal Korean large companies’ CEOs.
68
CEOs in our sample（M& A CEOs4）show younger age and higher education level than
normal large companies’ CEOs5. Table 4 shows correlations for all the major variables and
found no abnormal cases.
Initial investigation on the relationship with hypothesized key variables of age and
education and acquisition performance, shows interesting results, which generally shows a
negative relationship between education level and post-acquisition performance. But,
above master’s degree, a stronger negative relationship was observed.
As for the age, it shows negative relationship with post-acquisition performance as
figure 3 describes. It also supports hypothesized proposition of age’s negative impact on
acquisition performance.
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4 M & A CEOs represent sample CEOs of this research
5 Asia economic daily, a Korean newspaper company reported research result on Korean
top 100 companies’ CEOs. Research targeted the largest 100 companies’ CEOs held title
of Chief Executive Officer or more, non-family owners. （Asia Economic Daily,
2013.8.26）
Table 3. Descriptive statistics
N Minimum Maximum Mean
Standard
Deviation
ROAY1 38.00 －34.02 51.78 3.46 18.69
ROAY2 38.00 －37.16 45.07 1.62 16.39
ROEY1 38.00 －1.93 0.77 －0.06 0.54
ROEY2 38.00 －5.43 5.77 －0.02 1.36
Edu 28.00 16.00 23.00 17.71 2.31
Age 28.00 33.00 67.00 48.50 7.39
Prof exp 1, no 0 28.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.44
Outsider 1, insider 0 38.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.49
Intl exp 1, no 0 28.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.51
Related 1, unrelated 0 38.00 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.27
Acq. exp. 1, no exp. 0 38.00 0.00 1.00 0.87 0.34
LogFSY1 38.00 0.94 4.75 2.06 0.77
LogFSY2 38.00 0.87 4.72 2.08 0.75
DEY1 38.00 －705.84 2,048.78 249.79 466.86
DEY2 38.00 －8,108.57 1,966.67 －84.23 1,660.21
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Result of cross-sectional analysis based on the proposed research model is as table 5
exhibits. Among other dependent variables, models with dependent variable of ROA and
ROE for first and second year allowed us to find statistically significant outcomes
especially enable us to discover supporting evidence of proposed relations. In overall,
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Figure 2 Educational background acquisition performance（Model summary and parameter
estimates）
Dependent VaRriOabAleY: 2
Equation
Model Summary Parameter Estimates
R
Square
F df1 df2 Sig Constan b1 b2 b3
Linear .70 5.340 1 26 .029 56.759 －3.004
Quadratic .233 3.796 2 25 .036 －285.171 33.725 －.968
Cubic .232 3.770 2 25 .037 －167.105 15.117 0.000 －.017
The independent variable is Edu
model’s explanation power is not high due to small sample size. However, key variables’
relationships with post-acquisition measures were able to be interpreted with statistical
significance. As for the education, age and acquisition experience, cross-sectional analysis
also holds the hypothesized relationship with post-acquisition performance in accordance
with simple regression analysis as above. It supports education and age’ s diminishing
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Dependent VarRiaOblAe: Y2
Equation
Model Summary Parameter Estimates
R Square F df1 df2 Sig Constant b1
Linear .111 3.251 1 26 .083 40.274 －.757
Inverse .163 5.062 1 26 .033 －37.781 1957.058
The independent variable is Age.
Figure 3 Age and post-acquisition performance（Model summary and parameter estimates）
association with acquisition performance and acquisition experience’ s positive impact.
Unfortunately, hypothesis 3 and 5, the influence of CEO’s professional experience and
firms’ industry relatedness were not able to be verified with statistical significance. In
addition to the hypothesized variables, debt-equity ratio6 showed statistically significant
result.
Result of empirical analysis cannot be regarded as enough successful to confirm the
proposed hypotheses, since research model itself exposes limitations to contain enough
sample size, controlling statistical mistakes and so on. However, the research effort
provides meaningful grounds for further research to address the CEO or top management’
s demographic characteristics which enables acquired firm’s performance to be successful.
Considering the area covered by prior researches and rapidly changing business
environment, proposed research effort will contribute both practical and academic
perspective.
V. Discussion
Empirical results of this study interestingly conformed to proposed hypotheses and
attract us to go further solid research. Specifically, research result supports that too highly
73
Table 5. Regression results
ROA Y1 ROA Y2 ROE Y1 ROE Y2
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Intercept 1.148 1.885 * 1.318 2.536 ** 2.222 1.518 2.964 0.927
Edu －0.029 －1.409 －0.046 －2.750 ** －0.074 －1.504 －0.218 －2.130 **
Age －0.011 －1.989 * －0.010 －2.198 ** －0.022 －1.622 －0.010 －0.348
Outsider －0.021 －0.187 －0.041 －0.447 0.036 0.133 －0.106 －0.190
Prof Exp －0.025 －0.217 0.079 0.878 －0.224 －0.814 0.591 1.073
Intl Exp 0.036 0.338 0.015 0.179 0.017 0.067 0.701 1.350
Relatedness －0.039 －0.270 0.026 0.216 －0.060 －0.173 0.057 0.076
Acq. Exp 0.116 0.889 0.034 0.315 0.168 0.537 1.656 2.473 **
LogFS －0.043 －0.575 －0.024 －0.356 0.112 0.621 －0.368 －0.869
DE －0.017 －1.191 －0.001 －0.368 －0.088 －2.632 ** －0.014 －0.663
R2 0.351 0.425 0.479 0.473
F-stat 1.080 1.478 1.839 1.794
#of obersvation 27 27 27 27
* Significant at 0.1 level
** Significant at 0.05 level
6 Debt-equity ratio（DE）was negatively correlated with dependent variable of ROE Y1.
educated top management can be too conservative and risk-averse to decide any
adventurous actions, which are necessary in the event of M & A and post-merger
integration process. And, in terms of age, research result can be interpreted that too much
aged top management can have passive attitude on risk-taking moves and pursue more
stable outcomes. Thus, older CEO’s such tendency can get make firm’s situation worse
when conducting post-acquisition integration to take planned benefits. Considering M &
A’s unordinary situation, CEO’s agile and smart decision making is necessary for successful
post-acquisition performance. Thus, a certain level of experience, age, and knowledge
would be required but too much considerations and thoughts would not be unnecessary as
research result shows.
However, unfortunately, there are indisputable limitations to be complemented by
further research. First of all, this study cannot have sufficient amount of sample, which
need to include longer range of period or expand regional coverage including other
emerging countries in Asia. Plus, considering diverse influencing relationship of post-
acquisition performance, appropriate statistical control should be accompanied, which
requires profound understanding on the regional business environment and availability of
corresponding data to take proper statistical processing.
This study brings an opportunity to broaden theoretical perspective of addressing the
influence of CEO’s demographic characteristics on firm performance in two aspects. First,
it expands the scope of research objective from normal firm performance to post-
acquisition performance. It enables elaborative analysis on finding relationship between
CEO characteristics and firm performance in the particular event of M & A. Another
contributive aspect of this study is that the research intends to cover Asian emerging
country such as Korea, while prior research efforts had primarily been focused on Western
business environment so far. Hence, the point that research objective extends from normal
performance to the performance after the event of M & A and it expands the focus of
regional coverage toward emerging economy at far-east Asia, this research will offer
significant contribution on both practical and theoretical perspectives.
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